The doctrine that the content of the conclusion of a deductively valid argument is included in the content of its premises, taken jointly, is a familiar one. It has important consequences for the question of what value valid arguments possess, since it indicates the poverty of three traditional answers: that arguments may and should be used as instruments of persuasion, that they may and should be used as instruments of justification; and that they may and should be used to advance knowledge. The truth is, however, that in each of these cases the argument has only a managerial role and, if there is any work done, it is the premises that do it. It will be maintained that this point has little force against the critical rationalist answer, which I shall defend, that the principal purpose of deductive reasoning from an assemblage of premises is the exploration of their content, facilitating their criticism and rejection. That said, the main aim of the present paper is not to promote critical rationalism but to consider some published objections to the doctrine that a statement asserts every statement that is validly deducible from it. The alleged counterexamples to be considered fall roughly into two groups: statements that emerge with time from a rich mathematical or empirical theory, but were originally unformulated and are deducible from the theory only in a non-trivial way (Frederick 2011, 2014; Williamson 2012); and statements, notably disjunctions, that are easily formulated and are deducible from a theory in a trivial way (Schurz & Weingartner 1987; Mura 1990, 2008; Gemes 1994; Yablo 2014). Each of these counterexamples will be evaluated and dismissed.

The present study aims to defend moderate moral principlism in moral reasoning. According to this type of principlism-in a moral argument-although one of the premises of the argument is a moral principle, the position and situation in which the action is performed can be considered as another premise of the argument. To clarify and defend this principlism, it is necessary to analyze and examine competing approaches such as racial originality and moral particularism to provide a basis for endorsing this view. In this research, first, a report on Ross's principlism and his definition of principlism is presented. Dency's critiques and objections to Ross's definition are then expressed, and at the same time, Dency's particularism is examined. Finally, moderate moral principlism is defended. The result of the above arguments will be that in a moral argument all aspects must be considered-including principle, position and situation-and the approaches of extreme absolutism and moral principlism are not maximally successful, because at least they cannot solve the problem of moral conflict.

The subject of this paper is to examine and analyze the efficiency, or inefficiency, and the preference of functionalist theories, with an emphasis on Ross`s functionalism and Mill`s view in the field of ethical limitations. The authors have explained the standards for human deeds as being good or bad, right or wrong. The main question of the paper, performed with a descriptive-analytic method, follows as: when meeting ethical limitations, what is preferred, noting duty or its consequence? Achieving a stable and definite ethical criterion leading to the best consequence has necessitated the study. One important goal in the paper lies in explaining the failure of functionalism and conseque in deciding a standard for measuring the value of ethical deeds. One significant finding in the paper lies in the fact that regarding human intention, proximity and divine satisfaction in human deeds will cause both theories to be acceptable, in such a way that, in order to eliminate the limitation and to measure the correctness and inaccuracy of the acts, it may be regarded as the most decisive criterion.

Sir William David Ross, a deontological philosopher, proposed two concepts: "prima facie duty" and "actual duty" in his innovative theory to solve the problem of the conflict between duties which Kant faced. Conflict is only related to prima facie duties, but in actual duty, the doer always notice only one duty. However, Ross tried to offer other interpretations and use other term for "prima facie duty" by which he intended to fulfill his aims and objectives, because he was worried that it would be misunderstood. He offers five interpretations for "prima facie": conditional duty, particularistic duty, inclination towards duty, balance, and responsibility. The present paper deals with the semantics of "prima facie duty" in Ross's ethics, using an analytical approach.

George Orwell, the English novelist, wrote his famous novel "1984" to criticize the utopias of his era. In his novel, Orwell, always seeking to warn about the possible outcomes of totalitarianism, portrays a man who is subjugated by the rigid power structures and has become a political subject, a subject pushed to his limits. Therefore, the important point here is Orwell's view of human being and its transformation to a subject. Orwell's overemphasis on subjugation gives a metaphysical aspect to human being and at the same time offers him another utopian system. The very system that Orwell previously intended to criticize now entraps him. In fact, this is exactly where Orwell's paradox lies; since while criticizing utopia, he proposes non-dominance utopia to his metaphysical subject. This paradox is due to Orwell's view to human being as a political subject.

Since the time of Plato, relativism has been attacked as a self-refuting theory. Today, there are two basic kinds of argument that are used to show that global relativism is logically incoherent: first, a direct descendent of the argument Plato uses against Protagoras, called the peritrope; and, second, a more recent argument that relativism leads to an infinite regress. Although some relativist theories may be formulated in such a way as to be susceptible to these arguments, there are other versions of relativism that are impervious to these charges of incoherence. First the arguments against relativism will be stated. Next, a radical form of global relativism with assessment sensitivity is introduced, RR. Finally, it is shown how RR can be defended against the challenges of the peritrope and the regress. No attempt is made to defend RR as a plausible theory; however, the usual attempts to show the logical incoherence of radical forms of global relativism fail.